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I. INTRODUCTION
From 1973 to 1986, the amount of foreign capital invested in the
United States increased tenfold.' In 1973, the amount of foreign direct
investment in the United States was $20.556 billion. By 1986, that figure
had increased to $209.329 billion. Clearly, foreign capital has become a
necessary element for the economic growth of the United States and has
contributed significantly to the development of the nation.
Private investment falls into two categories: "direct" and "portfo-
lio." Foreign direct investment is the amount that residents of a country
invest in a foreign establishment or enterprise and thereby acquire partial
or total control of the firm or enterprise.2 Generally, the goal of a direct
investor is to gain an effective voice in managing the firm, sharing the
profits, and directing the operations of the particular business in the host
country. Portfolio investment occurs when foreign investors seek to di-
versify their assets by purchasing securities in a corporation but do not
hold enough shares to manage or control the business. Foreign direct
investment provides foreign interests with the opportunity to gain con-
trol of United States businesses and has become the source of recent con-
cern to United States policymakers.
While capital investment from any source is necessary for the devel-
opment of individual corporations as well as for the overall expansion of
the United States economy, United States policymakers also recognize
the danger of unrestricted foreign investment in the United States.
Overdependence upon foreign capital could lead to foreign control of ma-
1 See Scholl, The International Investment Position of the United States in 1986, 67 SuRv. OF
CURRENT Bus. 38 (June 1987).
2 The International Investment Survey Act of 1976, 22 U.S.C. § 3101-3108 (1982) defines "di-
rect investment" as the ownership or control, directly or indirectly, by one person of 10% or more of
the voting securities of a corporation or the equivalent interest of a non-incorporated enterprise, and
includes ownership of any type of property, including real estate.
3 HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, THE ADEQUACY OF THE FEDERAL RE-
SPONSE TO FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, H.R. REP. No. 1216, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1 (1980).
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jor corporations or entire industries. Such a result could subject United
States businesses to the political whims of foreign interests.4
Polieymakers have periodically raised concerns pertaining to foreign
investment in industries which affect national security or an essential na-
tional interest. The result has been the development of a small body of
regulations which limit or prohibit foreign investment in certain areas of
the United States economy. This series of administrative and legislative
restrictions was adopted on an ad hoc basis where the need for domestic
ownership outweighs the benefits of open investment.
Foreign control can be particularly dangerous in the defense indus-
try, where defense contractors have access to sensitive military informa-
tion and technology. In 1987, the Reagan administration extensively
addressed these dangers when Japanese-based Fujitsu Ltd. announced its
intention to acquire Fairchild Semiconductor Corporation, a California-
based defense contractor.' Although no specific legislative authority re-
stricts foreign investment in the defense industry, the assortment of ex-
isting regulations and guidelines provides a sufficient basis for the United
States government to eliminate or isolate any dangers such foreign in-
vestment may present.
This Comment examines the adequacy of the existing restrictions
upon foreign investment in industries holding defense contracts or hav-
ing access to national security information. After first presenting the rea-
sons underlying the United States commitment to an open investment
policy, the existing framework of regulations which apply to investors in
any area of the United States economy will be reviewed. An examination
of the regulations specifically applicable to investors in the defense indus-
try will follow. Next, the actual operation of the regulatory framework
during Fujitsu's attempt to acquire Fairchild Semiconductor Corpora-
tion will be considered. Finally, this Comment will analyze the most
recent legislative actions to limit foreign investment on a national secur-
ity basis and will conclude that in implementing the recently enacted
Exon Amendment, the United States government must act with restraint
and apply its authority to limit only those investments which threaten
national security without permitting that authority to become a tool to
protect domestic businesses and industries from foreign competition.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN OPEN INVESTMENT POLICY.
Capital investment from foreign nations played an important role in
4 A. ROTH, A GUIDE TO FOREIGN INVESTMENT UNDER UNITED STATES LAW 8 (1979)[here-
inafter GUIDE TO FOREIGN INVESTMENT].
5 See infra text accompanying notes 64-94.
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the growth of the United States, helping to finance the Louisiana
Purchase in 1803, the development of a nation-wide railroad network in
the 1850s, and the rapid industrialization of the United States during the
second half of the Nineteenth Century.6 Recognizing the importance of
an unrestricted flow of capital, United States policy on international in-
vestment is founded upon the theory that the private market is "the most
efficient means to determine the allocation and use of capital in the inter-
national economy." 7 As a result, the United States pursues an "open
door" approach to investment which offers no special incentives to for-
eigners who invest in the United States, and in general, imposes no spe-
cial barriers. Furthermore, once foreign investors establish themselves
within the United States economy, they generally receive the same treat-
ment as domestic investors.
Foreign entities find the United States a favorable investment mar-
ket for several reasons. First, the United States has one of the most sta-
ble economic and political systems in the world, and it subjects
businesses to fewer government economic and regulatory controls than
do other industrial nations. Second, the United States has the largest
consumer market in the world. With its common language and inte-
grated transportation and communication systems, businesses have sig-
nificant opportunity for future growth and profits. Third, through
participation in the United States marketplace, foreign investors can gain
access to United States technology as well as management and marketing
skills. Likewise, the United States has an abundance of raw materials
and natural resources unavailable in other nations. Through shared
technology and resources, foreign firms can enhance their own efficiency
and productivity and can become more competitive in the world market.8
Finally, the current economic condition of the United States is attractive
to foreign investors. As the United States dollar depreciates relative to
foreign currencies, in particular the Japanese yen, investment in the
United States becomes cheaper in terms of foreign currencies. This in-
creased purchasing power of foreign investors, combined with the de-
pressed value of the United States stock market, means that many United
6 GUIDE TO FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 4, at 3-5.
7 The Operations of Federal Agencies in Monitoring, Reporting On, and Analyzing Foreign In-
vestments in the United States (Part 3-Examination of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the
United States, Federal Policy Toward Foreign Investment, and Federal Data Collection Efforts): Hear-
ings Before a Subcomm. of the House Committee on Government Operations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 80
(1979)(statement of C. Fred Bergsten, Asst. Sec'y of the Treasury for International Af-
fairs)[hereinafter Operations of Federal Agencies].
8 Acquisitions By Foreign Companies" Hearing on S.907 Before the Senate Comm. On Com-
merce, Science, and Transportation, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1987)(statement of Malcolm Bal-
dridge, Secretary of Commerce) [hereinafter Acquisitions by Foreign Companies].
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States businesses can be purchased for less than the total value of their
assets.
Foreign investors, however, are not the only ones who benefit: a pol-
icy conducive to foreign investment likewise benefits the United States
by stimulating the growth of individual companies and expanding the
nation's economy. Increased foreign investment helps the United States
meet its rapidly growing need for capital. By stimulating the inflow of
capital, the supply of capital available to United States businesses is in-
creased, which in turn reduces the cost of acquiring capital from domes-
tic sources. Consequently, United States businesses can expand their
productivity and thereby strengthen the growth of the national econ-
omy.9 Furthermore, foreign-owned companies produce the same benefits
for the United States economy as domestically-owned businesses, such as
employment opportunities, tax revenues and competitively-priced goods
and services. Finally, in the same way that foreign entities benefit from
United States technology and resources, the participation of those foreign
businesses in the United States market also contributes new technology
and innovations which induce United States companies to increase their
efficiency, productivity and competitiveness.
In addition, maintaining an open investment policy and a climate
receptive to foreign capital promotes United States efforts to remove re-
strictions on investment in other countries. Investors from the United
States provide the largest source of capital in the world, and the elimina-
tion of investment barriers enhances the ability of United States firms to
invest in other nations. This, in turn, enables those nations to earn cash
to purchase United States exports and to finance their debts. 10 In the
macroeconomy, therefore, an open investment policy can benefit all
participants.
Despite the historical commitment of the United States to pursuing
a liberal policy open to foreign investment, substantial authority permits
the government to regulate or restrict the inflow of foreign capital.
Under customary international law, every nation has the sovereign power
to restrict the acquisition by aliens of property within its territory.1'
Furthermore, the United States Constitution grants to the federal gov-
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 OECD Draft Convention for the Protection of Foreign Property (1962), reprinted in 2 I.L.M.
241 (1963). Furthermore, in the member nations of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) have declared that the obligations to promote economic development and
abolish restrictions on the flow of capital shall not prevent a nation from taking actions necessary to
maintain public order or protect its essential security interests. OECD, Code of Liberalisation of
Capital Movements, Art. III (1982).
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ernment specific authority to regulate foreign investment under the for-
eign commerce clause, l" and under the provisions establishing the power
to conduct foreign affairs 3 and to provide for the national defense.14
In response to the growth of the United States economy and the
expansion of foreign investment, the United States government devel-
oped a framework for foreign investors which promotes the flow of capi-
tal while protecting national security interests. A foreign investor who
seeks to acquire a controlling interest in a United States company must
comply with the same laws and regulatory constraints applicable to do-
mestic investors.'" However, in addition to the laws which regulate the
general conduct of foreign investors in the United States market, the gov-
ernment imposes specific restrictions on foreign investment in industries
which are necesary to national defense or public welfare.
16
III. GENERAL UNITED STATES INVESTMENT REGULATIONS.
A. Antitrust Laws
Foreign investors who attempt to enter the United States market, or
increase their current market position by acquiring an existing United
States business, must comply with the federal antitrust laws. These laws
prohibit unfair aggregations of economic power which might weaken or
destroy competition."'
Section Seven of the Clayton Act prevents foreign investors, acting
singly or collectively, from acquiring, or participating in a merger or
joint venture with, a United States firm if the result would substantially
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly.' 8 Acquisitions, mergers
or joint ventures by foreign investors may similarly be prevented under
Sections One or Two of the Sherman Act, if the transactions unreasona-
12 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. "The Congress shall have Power... (3) To regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations .. "
13 Id. at art. II, § 2, cl. 2. "[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate to make Treaties .. "
14 Id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 1. "The Congress shall have Power To ... provide for the common
Defense and general Welfare of the United States .... "
15 The two primary investment regulations are the antitrust laws (see infra notes 17-23 and
accompanying text) and the securities laws (see infra notes 24-31 and accompanying text).
16 GUIDE TO FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 4, at 157. The areas restricted from foreign
investment by specific legislation are: banking, exploitation of natural resources, energy, transporta-
tion, communications, and the maritime industry. Roth, Foreign Investment Regulation in the
United States, 4 CORP. L. REV. 178 (198 1)[hereinafter Foreign Investment Regulation]. Restrictions
on foreign investment in the United States defense industry are authorized by Executive Order
10,865 (see infra note 34 and accompanying text).
17 Griffith, Federal Antitrust Restrictions on Foreign Direct Investment in the US., in MANUAL
OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 22 (J. Marans ed. 1984).
18 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982).
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bly restrain trade or illegally attempt to monopolize a particular mar-
ket.19 Section Five of the Federal Trade Commission Act prohibits
domestic or foreign-owned businesses from utilizing unfair methods of
competition.2"
Before an acquisition of voting securities, or of assets exceeding a
specified amount,21 may be completed, a foreign investor must notify the
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission of the pro-
posed transaction. These enforcement agencies have a statutory time pe-
riod in which to complete an investigation of the transaction and to
ensure compliance with the antitrust laws.22
In enforcing the antitrust laws, the Department of Justice makes
"no essential distinction . ..between domestic and foreign firms.",23
Thus, while a foreign investor must be able to resist a challenge under
any of the applicable antitrust provisions, the antitrust laws impose no
stricter standard upon foreign investors than they do upon domestic
investors.
B. Securities Laws
A foreign corporation planning to issue securities in the United
States market, or obtain a controlling interest in a publicly-held United
States company, must comply with the proxy rules and disclosure re-
quirements contained in the Securities Act of 193324 and the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934.25 Among their objectives, these laws require
disclosure of significant foreign ownership, prevent fraud and manipula-
tion of stock prices, promote full disclosure of information, and generally
preserve orderly markets.
Congress significantly expanded investment disclosure requirements
in the 1970's. The expanded requirements enabled the Departments of
Commerce and the Treasury to oversee and regulate, but not necessarily
restrict, foreign investment activity in the United States.26 At that time,
19 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1982).
20 15 U.S.C. § 45.
21 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a)(3). An acquisition must be reported under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act
only if it would result in the acquiring entity holding at least 15% of the voting securities or assets of
the acquired entity, or an aggregate total amount of voting securities and/or assets of the acquired
entity in excess of $15 million.
22 Title II of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976. 15 U.S.C. § 18a
(1982).
23 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR OPERATIONS 9 (Rev. ed. 1977).
24 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-7Thbbb (1982).
25 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982).
26 Almond & Goldstein, Foreign Direct Investment in the United State" An Overview, 7 N.C.J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 153, 156 (1982).
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Congress took two steps to require more detailed disclosure by foreign
investors. First, Congress adopted the International Investment Survey
Act of 1976 ("IISA"),27 which directs the President to compile statistical
information concerning foreign direct and portfolio investment in the
United States. Accordingly, Executive Order No. 11,96128 authorizes
the Department of Commerce to conduct the direct investment survey
and the Department of the Treasury to conduct the portfolio investment
survey, with the results reported every five years.2 9 Additionally, Con-
gress enacted the Domestic and Foreign Investment Improved Disclo-
sure Act of 1977,30 which amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
to require more complete disclosure by foreign investors holding over five
percent of any class of security described in Section 13(d)(1) 31 of the
1934 Act, including the residence and citizenship of the person reporting
as well as the nature of any beneficial ownership of securities.
IV. RESTRICTIONS ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES DEFENSE INDUSTRY.
The United States defense industry is one of the few national interest
areas in which foreign participation is restricted. The dangers of giving
foreign investors access to national security information as well as the
ability to control the production of defense materials outweigh the bene-
fits of unrestricted investment in the defense industry. Although Con-
gress has not adopted any explicit regulations on foreign investment in
the defense industry, the Executive Branch has developed a framework of
guidelines to regulate such investment. This framework creates a flexible
standard to evaluate, and restrict when necessary, foreign investment in
the defense industry. 2
A. The Defense Industrial Security Program
The Defense Industrial Security Program ("Security Program")
33
took effect in 1965, and it established guidelines for granting security
clearance to defense contractors owned or controlled by foreign inves-
tors. By executive order, President Eisenhower directed the Secretary of
Defense to promulgate regulations to safeguard the classified Depart-
27 22 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3108 (1982).
28 Exec. Order No. 11,961, 3 C.F.R. 86 (1977).
29 GUIDE TO FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 16, at 16.
30 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78o (1982).
31 15 U.S.C. § 78m(g)(1)(1980).
32 Foreign Investment Regulation, supra note 16, at 195-200.
33 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAM,
Directive 5220.22 (1965).
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ment of Defense or national security information made available to
United States industries.34 The Defense Investigative Service ("Ser-
vice"), a division within the Department of Defense coordinates and en-
forces the Security Program.35
The Industrial Security Regulations ("Regulations")3 6 set forth the
basic policies and procedures of the program, and the Industrial Security
Manual ("Manual")37 outlines the uniform security practices which all
contractors with access to classified information must follow. Any con-
tract for work involving access to such information must include a provi-
sion requiring the contractor to execute a security agreement binding the
contractor to comply with the procedures set forth in the Manual.38
The central focus of the Security Program is that no contractor may
receive access to classified information unless the contractor's facility has
been granted a security clearance level which meets the security classifi-
cation level of the information to be disclosed.39 Furthermore, no subsid-
iary company may have access to classified information unless its parent
company has an equivalent, or higher, clearance level than the subsidi-
ary-' The Regulations stipulate that clearance may be granted only to
contractors "organized and existing under the laws of the U.S. or Puerto
Rico," and any facilities "which are determined to be under foreign own-
ership, control or influence ("FOCI") are not eligible for clearance."41
However, a finding of FOCI does not necessarily prohibit the security
clearance, for the Regulations identify several methods for negating or
34 Exec. Order No. 10865, 3 C.F.R. 398 (Feb. 20, 1960). The President also directed that the
regulations created by the Department of Defense could be adopted by any other federal department
or agency as a standard for protecting classified information. Id. at § l(b). See also Foreign Invest-
ment Regulation, supra note 16, at 189. The following agencies currently subscribe to the security
standards established by the Department of Defense: the Departments of Commerce, State, Treas-
ury, Transportation, Interior, Agriculture, Health & Human Services, Labor, and Justice; the Na-
tional Aeronautics & Space Administration, the General Services Administration, the Small
Business Administration, the National Science Foundation, the United States Information Agency,
the Environmental Protection Agency, the United States Arms Control & Disarmament Agency, the
Federal Reserve System, and the General Accounting Office. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, INDUS-
TRIAL SECURITY MANUAL FOR SAFEGUARDING CLASSIFIED INFORMATION, Directive 5220.22-M,
§ I(c)(Dec. 1985).
35 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, Directive 5220.22-M, at § I(d).
36 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, INDUSTRIAL SECURITY REGULATION, Directive 5220.22-R
(Dec. 1985).
37 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, Directive 5220.22-M (Dec. 1985).
38 Swenen, Federal Restrictions on Participation by Foreign Investors in Defense and Other Gov-
ernment Contracts, in MANUAL OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 181 (J. Marans
ed. 1984).
39 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, Directive 5220.22-R, § 2-101.
40 Id. at § 2-104(b).
41 Id. at § 2-102(a).
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reducing the dangers of FOCI.42
The greatest obstacle to foreign investment in the defense industry is
passing the threshold test for FOCI. There is no standard determination
of what constitutes FOCI, and decisions are made on a case-by-case ba-
sis.43 Ultimately, the determination of FOCI is a subjective evaluation,
in which the Service has substantial discretionary authority. Under the
Regulations, a defense contractor's facility may be denied security clear-
ance when "a reasonable basis exists to conclude that the nature and
extent of FOCI is such that foreign dominance over the management or
operations of the facility may result in the compromise of classified infor-
mation or impact adversely the performance on classified contracts."'
The factors considered in determining whether FOCI exists include
the following: foreign direct or beneficial ownership of 5% or more of an
organization's securities; the extent to which foreign interests hold man-
agement positions or control or influence directors, officers or executives
of an organization; the extent of a company's contracts with or indebted-
ness to foreign interests; having income from foreign interests which ex-
ceeds 10% of gross income; or any further evidence indicating the
capability of a foreign interest to control or influence the management or
operations of the organization and thereby gain access to sensitive infor-
mation.45 Such broad criteria permit the Service wide latitude in making
its determinations.
The Regulations specify five steps which may enable a FOCI facility
to qualify for security clearance. First, security clearance may be granted
to a company controlled by investors from a nation having a Reciprocal
Industrial Security Agreement with the United States.46 These agree-
ments establish arrangements whereby a facility located in one of the
signatory countries, but under the ownership, control, or influence of a
party from the other country, may be declared eligible for access to clas-
sified information. Currently, the United States has such agreements
with the United Kingdom, Canada and the Federal Republic of Ger-
many. For a FOCI facility to qualify for clearance on this basis, how-
ever, the foreign government of the investing entity must issue a security
assurance for that particular company, and the company cannot receive
access to classified information which could not be shared between the
signatory governments. 47
42 See infra text accompanying notes 46-54.
43 Swennen, supra note 38, at 184.
44 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 5220.22-R, § 2-201(a).
45 Id. at § 2-202.
46 Id. at § 2-205.
47 Id.
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Second, a company under FOCI may neutralize the effects of for-
eign ownership by enacting a board resolution. The resolution must
identify all foreign shareholders, their representatives, and the extent of
their ownership. It must also certify that they and their representatives
will be excluded from access to the company's classified information and
from any positions which would enable them to influence the company's
policies and practices in performing classified contracts.48 This option
requires that the chairman and chief executive officer of the firm be
United States citizens, that a foreign interest is not the largest single
shareholder, and that identified United States citizens own a majority of
the stock.
Third, when foreign investors own the majority interest of a United
States company or have effective control over the management, they can
establish a Voting Trust Agreement. This procedure insulates the for-
eign influence by unequivocally transferring legal title in the foreign in-
vestor's stock to trustees who are United States citizens approved by the
Service. These trustees must not have any prior connection with the
company or the investor, yet must hold personnel security clearances
permitting access to classified information.49 The trustees must hold all
the management powers derived from the stock ownership and must en-
sure that the foreign stockholders are insulated from the cleared facility,
having no status other than that of a beneficiary.50
Fourth, a United States facility may be insulated from minority for-
eign ownership if the foreign investors convey their voting rights in the
stock to proxy holders by an irrevocable proxy agreement. Although the
conditions and requirements for the proxy agreement are the same as for
a Voting Trust Agreement, the foreign investors retain legal title to the
stock while granting all management powers to the proxy holders.5 '
Finally, when a foreign interest owns a majority of the voting stock
of a United States firm, or has effective control over operations or man-
agement, but chooses not to relinquish that control, the firm, the foreign
investor, and the Department of Defense may execute a Special Security
Agreement to neutralize the FOCI.52 Such an agreement is available
only (1) when the foreign interest represents a nation having a formal
Reciprocal Security Agreement with the United States, when all person-
48 Id. at § 2-205(a).
49 Every individual employed by a defense contractor must be deemed eligible, from a security
standpoint, for access to classified information. See DEPARTMiENT OF DEFENSE, Directive 5220.22-
R, § 2-302.
50 Id. at § 2-205(b).
51 Id. at § 2-205(c).
52 Id. at § 2-205(e).
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nel requiring security clearance are United States citizens, and when the
facility clearance is below the TOP SECRET53 level; or (2) when the
foreign investor's nation has a bilateral security agreement with the
United States, all personnel requiring security clearance are United
States citizens, and the facility clearance is limited to the CONFIDEN-
TIAL level.54
Thus, under the authority of the Security Program, the Department
of Defense can limit the participation of foreign investors in the defense
industry. Although there are no statutory prohibitions to such invest-
ment, the Department of Defense has the ability to create a disincentive
for foreign investors who propose to acquire ownership of a defense con-
tractor. Faced with the possibility of losing security clearance and
thereby its defense contracts, foreign investors are unlikely to pursue in-
vestments which no longer would be profitable.
The test of foreign control, however, is a flexible one. By reserving
the right to grant security clearance if an investment or acquisition is
structured to minimize the impact of foreign ownership, the Department
of Defense may refrain from interfering with foreign investment which
does not pose a threat to sensitive security information.
B. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
As the amount of foreign investment rapidly increased in the early
1970s," both Congress and the Executive branch began to review foreign
investment policy. This review led to the Foreign Investment Study Act
of 1974 ("Study").56 The Study did not signal any change from the tradi-
tional open investment policy of the United States, but did serve as the
basis for the expanded disclosure requirements implemented in 1977.17
In response to the Study's conclusion that foreign investment in the
United States was not sufficiently monitored, President Ford created the
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States ("CFIUS", or
53 TOP SECRET is the highest level of security classification, and it applies ony to information
or material which would cause "exceptionally grave damage" to national security if it were disclosed
without authorization. See DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, Directive 5220.22-M, at § 3(cl).
54 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 5220.22-R, at § 2-202(e)(3). CONFIDENTIAL is the second
highest level of security classification, and it applies to information or material which could cause
"damage" to national security if it were disclosed without authorization. See DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE, Directive 5220.22-M, at § 3(v).
55 Albrecht, Current Attitudes Toward and Studies of Foreign Investment in the United States, in
CURRENT LEGAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 260-61 (D. Evans
ed. 1976).
56 15 U.S.C. § 78(b)(1982). This act was the first legislative measure authorizing the collection
of foreign investment information.
57 See supra text accompanying notes 27-31.
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"the Committee"). 8 CFIUS is an interagency committee consisting of
representatives from the Departments of State, Treasury, Defense, and
Commerce, the United States Trade Representative, and the Council of
Economic Advisers. The Committee has "primary continuing responsi-
bility within the Executive Branch for monitoring the impact of both
direct and portfolio foreign investment in the United States and for coor-
dinating the implementation of United States policy on such invest-
ment." 9 In carrying out these functions, the Committee is to consult
with foreign governments on significant foreign governmental invest-
ments and to review any private investments in the United States which,
"in the judgment of the Committee, might have major implications for
United States national interests." 60
Discretionary review is the fundamental authority vested in the
Committee, for it has no authority to administer any laws or regulations.
Instead, CFIUS assesses the impact of proposed foreign investments and
recommends ways to apply existing regulations to eliminate a threat to
national security. The Committee has a number of options to ensure that
a proposed transaction is consistent with United States national security
interests.
When CFIUS determines that an investment by a foreign govern-
ment may threaten United States national security interests, the Commit-
tee relies upon direct consultations between the United States
government and the investing government. In 1975, the United States
government requested all foreign governments to consult with CFIUS
before pursuing any major direct investments in the United States.61
This consultation process enables the United States government to ad-
dress most national security concerns through diplomatic measures
before the foreign government becomes substanially committed to the in-
vestment. By indicating opposition to an investment through diplomatic
representations, the United States government can persuade a foreign
government either to refrain from investing or to restructure the transac-
tion to isolate the foreign influence.62
Even in the case of private foreign investment, the Committee be-
lieves that a strong negative reaction by the United States government
58 Exec. Order No. 11,858, 3A C.F.R. 990 (1975).
59 Id. at § 1(b).
60 Id. at § 1(b)(3). The Committee has specifically refrained from defining what constitutes "ma-
jor implications for United States national interests," because the factors involved may be numerous
and the Committee believes that such decisions should be made on a case-by-case basis. Operations
of Federal Agencies, supra note 7, at 63.
61 Operations of Federal Agencies, supra note 7, at 63.
62 Id.
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would be sufficient to deter a proposed transaction. If not, however,
CFIUS can suggest several policy options. If the transaction would
lessen competition or create a monopoly, CFIUS can advise that United
States antitrust laws be applied to block the transaction. If the transac-
tion would provide foreign access to classified technology, CFIUS can
ensure that the guidelines of the Defense Industrial Security Program are
enforced to isolate the foreign influence or revoke the security clearance.
Finally, if CFIUS determines that an extraordinary threat to national
security, foreign policy or the economy exists, CFIUS can advise the
President, under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
("IEEPA"),63 to block a foreign acquisition of a United States company
or compel the divestiture of foreign interests in an acquired domestic
company.
CFIUS was created to monitor the impact of foreign investment in
the United States and to coordinate any necessary response. Despite the
Committee's lack of direct enforcement authority, by fulfilling its role as
a policy coordinating body, the Committee ensures that investments ad-
verse to United States national security interests are limited or
prohibited.
V. APPLICATION OF THE EXISTING REGULATORY FRAMEWORK.
During the fall of 1986 and early 1987, the entire range of restric-
tions on foreign investment was applied when Fujitsu Ltd. ("Fujitsu"),
one of Japan's largest computer manufacturers, attempted to acquire
California-based Fairchild Semiconductor Corporation ("Fairchild").64
Fairchild was one of the first semiconductor companies to base its opera-
tions in California's Silicon Valley during the 1950s. In 1986, Schlum-
berger Ltd. ("Schlumberger"), an oil-field services and electronics
company based in New York but controlled by French interests, owned
Fairchild.65
Fairchild is a primary supplier of micro-technology for United
States defense contractors, manufacturing sophisticated microchips,
called high-speed bipolar gate arrays, critical to the operation and gui-
dance of military weapons, since they can withstand radiation during a
nuclear attack.66 Tokyo-based Fujitsu produces computers and telecom-
63 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1982).
64 Wall St. J., Oct. 24, 1986, at 10, col. 2.
65 Wall St. J., Mar. 13, 1987, at 5, col. 2. Schlumberger purchased Fairchild for $425 million in
1979, Wall St. J., Oct. 24, 1986, at 10, col. 2, and despite an infusion of $1.5 billion, the semiconduc-
tor unit remained a serious drain on struggling Schlumberger. Wall. St. J., Feb. 23, 1987, at 24, col.
3.
66 Wall St. J., Nov. 17, 1986, at 40, col. 3.
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munications equipment, and specializes in the high volume memory-
chips necessary to the computer industry. Fujitsu produces its semicon-
ductor components in Japan and assembles and packages some of the
units at its San Diego-based subsidiary, Fujitsu Microelectronics Incor-
porated.67 In addition, the Japanese conglomerate at that time owned
48% of Amdahl Corporation, a California-based producer of large main-
frame computer systems.68
Under the proposed acquisition, Fujitsu would acquire 80% of
Fairchild and combine it with Fujitsu's San Diego subsidiary to create
the fifth largest semiconductor producer in the world. The transaction
would provide Fujitsu with a plant and an established distribution net-
work in the United States, access to research and development, an ex-
emption from some of the pricing and import restrictions imposed on
Japanese semiconductor manufacturers, and a 6% share of the United
States semiconductor market.
69
Fujitsu's announcement of its intention to acquire Fairchild sparked
an outcry of opposition from representatives in the Reagan administra-
tion and from the semiconductor industry.70 To coordinate the Reagan
administration's response to these concerns, CFIUS71 began meetings in
October 1986 to evaluate the benefits and detriments of Fujitsu's propo-
sal, to clarify the extent to which the United States would accept foreign
control of companies performing sensitive defense-related work, and to
assess the options the United States government would have if it decided
to challenge the transaction.72 At the direction of CFIUS, various de-
partments initiated procedures to review the effects and implications of
the transaction upon antitrust concerns, the national security, and over-
all trade policy considerations.
In accordance with the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act,7" the Antitrust Di-
vision of the Department of Justice commenced a routine merger re-
view.74 Because both Fujitsu and Fairchild were leaders in the rapidly
growing market for gate array systems,7" the acquisition would consoli-
date market share and make Fujitsu the number one producer in the gate
67 Wall St. J., Oct. 24, 1986, at 10, col. 2.
68 Wall St. ., Oct. 27, 1986, at 6, col. 1.
69 N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1986, at 4, col. 2.
70 Wall St. J., Oct. 31, 1986, at 8, col. 2.
71 See supra text accompanying notes 55-63.
72 See Wall St. J., Oct. 31, 1986, at 8, col. 2, and Dec. 29, 1986, at 4, col. 2.
73 See supra notes 18, 21-23, and accompanying text.
74 Wall St. J., Nov. 17, 1986, at 40, col. 3.
75 Gate array systems are the programmable microchips which perform specific mathematical or
logical functions in computer systems. See Wall St. L, Oct. 27, 1986, at 6, col. 1.
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array market.76 Although the antitrust division ultimately did not com-
plete a determination on the impact of the merger on competition,77 no
antitrust violations may have occurred, because Fujitsu's main business
focus is on memory chips which store data, while Fairchild's focus is on
the logic chips which manipulate the data.7 8
Because approximately 40% of Fairchild's products are sold to pri-
mary defense contractors such as Rockwell International Corporation,
Hughes Aircraft, and Raytheon Company, the Department of Defense
undertook a review of the effects the transaction would have on national
security and defense contracting. 79 This investigation focused upon po-
tential violations of the Defense Industrial Security Program80 which
would occur if Japanese investors gained majority control over a defense
contractor and subsequently had access to defense information and tech-
nology.8 During 1986, Fairchild performed approximately $150 million
of government contract work on semiconductors, one-third of which was
proprietary work which other companies could not have replicated.
82
Military officials in the Department of Defense were concerned that
Fujitsu could not be trusted to protect the classified defense technology
made available to Fairchild in performing defense contracts.83
Those officials also feared that if a national emergency should arise,
the United States must have enough control over domestic production to
ensure an adequate supply of the microchips.8" These officials worried
that if a Fujitsu-controlled Fairchild shifted away from the military busi-
ness to focus on more profitable civilian projects, the United States would
no longer be able to manufacture the microchips on its own.85
Although the government does not possess the legal authority to
76 Id.
77 See infra text accompanying notes 92-94.
78 Wall St. J., Nov. 17, 1986, at 40, col. 3.
79 Wall St. J., Dec. 29, 1986, at 4, col. 2.
80 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
81 N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1987, § 1, at 1, col. 1. When French-investor-controlled Schlumberger
purchased Fairchild, there was much less opposition to the sale, although Fairchild did lose its top-
secret security clearance. See WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 1987, at 24, col. 3. In fact, one Department of
Defense official indicated that the national security concerns of Fairchild's sale could be eliminated if
it were acquired by a company controlled by investors from a NATO country. Wall St. J., Nov. 17,
1986, at 40, col. 3.
82 Wall St. J., Mar. 17, 1987, at 3, col. 1.
83 Wall St. J., Dec. 29, 1986, at 4, col. 2.
84 Wall St. J., Oct. 31, 1986, at 8, col. 2.
85 Wall St. J., Dec. 29, 1986, at 4, col. 2. This was of particular concern in late 1986 when there
were persistent rumors that Japanese-based Hitachi Co. was seeking to acquire Motorola, Inc., the
only other major United States manufacturer of these critical microchips. Id., Oct. 31, 1986, at 8,
col. 2.
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prevent an acquisition on national security grounds, the Department of
Defense does have the ability to impede a transaction or nullify its bene-
fits if defense-contracting security requirements are not met.86 It is possi-
ble that the national security threats could have been eliminated if the
defense-related portions of the firm were separated from the rest of the
business and managed solely by United States citizens. If that were ac-
complished, Fujitsu would benefit from the profits of the firm but would
not be allowed access to the technology. 7
A final area of concern with Fujitsu's proposed acquisition of
Fairchild was the implication for overall United States trade policy. Sev-
eral federal agencies expressed concern that Fujitsu's proposal might in-
dicate the commencement of a Japanese attempt to dominate the United
States semiconductor industry. If the United States computer industry
continues to slump, other United States manufacturers could become
takeover targets.88 Members of government and industry strongly op-
posed the acquisition because it came "at a time when Japanese semicon-
ductor firms ha[d] been accused of dumping computer chips in [United
States] markets at prices lower than it cost to make them.1
8 9
Similarly, because of the competition between the Japanese and
United State manufacturers in the computer industry, there was strong
opposition to allowing the Japanese greater access to United States re-
search and development technology. In particular, with Japan's compet-
itiveness in non-military semiconductor technology, United States
government and industry officials opposed giving a Japanese company
access to an area of strength for United States producers.90 Further-
more, the Secretary of Commerce at that time expressed concern that the
acquisition would enable Fujitsu to use Fairchild's distribution network
to market its own Japanese-made supercomputers, while the Japanese
government continued to impose strict limitations on the ability of
United States companies to market supercomputers in Japan.91
Ultimately, none of the departments issued any formal conclusions
on the impact of the transaction, for in March 1987, Fujitsu abruptly
withdrew its offer to acquire Fairchild.92 By that time, opposition to the
acquisition had coalesced within the Executive Branch, primarily be-
86 See supra text accompanying notes 39-42.
87 Wall St. J., Oct. 31, 1986, at 8, c6l. 2.
88 Wall St. J., Dec. 29, 1986, at 4, col. 2.
89 Wall St. J., Mar. 17, 1987, at 3, col. 1. United States companies estimated that this practice
produced losses for domestic companies exceeding $1 billion. Id.
90 Wall St. 3., Nov. 17, 1986, at 40, col. 3.
91 Wall St. J., Mar. 13, 1987 at 5,'col. 2.
92 Wall St. J., Mar. 18, 1987, at 2, col. 2.
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cause of United States national security concerns as well as the continu-
ing trade disputes with Japan. 93 Confronted with such strong opposition,
Fujitsu decided not to proceed with the transaction, stating that "going
through with the deal by force is not our way.... We don't want to
invest. . . if it isn't welcome."9 4 In sum, the Fujitsu incident demon-
strates that, although CFIUS does not have any legal authority to block
investments, by exerting public and diplomatic pressure on foreign inter-
ests, the Committee can create an unfavorable climate for foreign inves-
tors. The presence of an unfavorable environment will thereby protect
United States national security interests from harmful foreign
investment.
VI. THE EXON AMENDMENT.
Although Fujitsu ultimately abandoned its attempt to acquire
Fairchild, the incident highlighted the potential shortcomings of United
States policy for controlling foreign investment in national interest sec-
tors such as defense procurement. Members of Congress, the Reagan
administration, and leaders of United States industry raised concerns
about the apparent lack of authority to prevent foreign acquisitions of
security-sensitive United States businesses and renewed the movement to
restrict foreign investment in the defense industry. The result of this
drive is Section 5021 of the "Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988" ("Exon Amendment").9" The provision, entitled "Authority to
Review Certain Mergers, Acquisitions and Takeovers," establishes a
mechanism to investigate mergers, acquisitions or takeovers of any
United States domestic corporation by foreign investors and provides the
authority to suspend or prohibit such a transaction if it might endanger
or impair national security.
The enacted version of the Exon Amendment represents the culmi-
nation of nearly two years of Congressional deliberation. A joint confer-
ence committee of the House and Senate ("Conference Committee")
drafted the legislation to reconcile the differing proposals that the House
of Representatives and the Senate had previosly adopted. The House
bill9 6 mandated that the Secretary of Commerce, upon his own initiative
or at the request of any agency head, investigate any merger, acquisition,
joint venture, licensing or takeover by or with foreign companies which
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5021, 102 Stat.
1107, 1425 (1988).
96 H.R. 3, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., § 905 (1987)[hereinafter H.R. 3 (House Version)].
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involve United States companies participating in interstate commerce,
and assess the effects of the transaction upon national security, essential
commerce, and economic welfare.97 If the investigation demonstrated
that foreign control of firms engaged in interstate and foreign commerce
would threaten to impair national security and essential commerce, the
President must take whatever action he considers appropriate, unless he
determines that no threat to national security or essential commerce ex-
ists. With such a broad and ambiguous standard as "national security,
essential commerce and economic welfare," the House bill seemed to
have been aimed at precluding foreign investment altogether in busi-
nesses even remotely connected to United States national security, and
thus appears to be a form of trade protection implemented under the
guise of national security concerns.
In contrast, the Senate sought to amend ("Senate version") 98 the
House bill by granting the Secretary of Commerce discretionary, rather
than mandatory, power to initiate investigations only upon the request of
Cabinet-level department heads, and to limit the criteria for review to
"national security or essential commerce which affects national secur-
ity."99 Furthermore, the provision was drafted as an amendment to Title
VII of the Defense Production Act of 1950,1°° and applied only to merg-
ers, acquisitions or takeovers. While the provision granted the President
full discretion as to whether to act on the Secretary's recommendation, it
nevertheless did require that the President report the results of each in-
vestigation to Congress. It also gave Congress the option to enact a joint
resolution preventing the President from acting to restrict, suspend or
prohibit the transaction. Although the Senate version had a greater fo-
cus on national security than the House bill, it nevertheless created an
arbitrary and ambiguous authority which could have made the invest-
ment climate more uncertain for foreign investors and would likely have
undermined the open investment policy.
In an effort to eliminate some of the ambiguity and the broad scope
of the original proposals, the Exon Amendment states that the President,
or his designee, within thirty days after receiving written notice of a pro-
posed or pending merger, acquisition or takeover, "may make an investi-
gation to determine the effects on national security."' 0 1 Such an
investigation must be completed within forty-five days after the President
97 H.R. 3 (House Version) at § 907.
98 H.R. 3, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., § 1401 (1987)[hereinafter H.R. 3 (Senate Version)].
99 Id.
100 50 U.S.C. App. § 2158 et seq. (1982).
101 Defense Production Act of 1950 (as amended) § 721(a), 50 U.S.C. App. § 2158 et seq.
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determines that the investigation is necessary. If the investigation indi-
cates that there is "credible evidence" that the foreign interest exercising
control might take action that threatens to impair national security, and
no other provisions of law--other than IEEPA1°2-- provide adequate au-
thority to protect national security, then the President may take any ac-
tion, for such time as he considers appropriate, to suspend or prohibit the
transaction. 
10 3
On December 27, 1988, President Reagan issued Executive Order
12,661, °4 which empowers CFIUS to undertake and coordinate the in-
vestigations under the Exon Amendment, and to report the results to the
President. In addition, the President directed the Department of the
Treasury to issue regulations necessary to implement Section 721 of the
Defense Production Act.
10 5
In reporting on the Senate version, the Senate Committee on Com-
merce, Science and Transportation stated that the amendment was not
intended to impose barriers to foreign investment, "nor to have any effect
on transactions which are clearly outside the realm of national secur-
ity."' 106 Furthermore, Senator James Exon (D-NE), the sponsor of the
amendment, emphasized that the "legislation does not compel any ac-
tion, it simply prevents future Presidents from throwing up their hands
and saying 'I cannot do anything,' while America's national security in-
dustries and technologies fall under foreign control.""1 7
Despite those statements that the Senate version had a limited scope
and purpose, its breadth and ambiguity seemed to create authority di-
rected more towards protecting United States businesses from foreign in-
vestors rather than protecting true national security interests. Congress
is correct to recognize that the government should have the authority to
review investments and prevent the control of United States companies
by foreign entities, where that control would have a direct adverse effect
on the national security of the United States. However, any attempt to
revise or redefine United States policy on foreign investment must be
measured against the overall goal of United States investment policy.
Foreign investment plays an essential role in the economic develop-
ment of the United States. Therefore, our investment policy should pro-
mote and strengthen an economic environment which is conducive to
102 See note 63, supra, and accompanying text.
103 Defense Production Act of 1950, § 721(c); 50 U.S.C. App. § 2158 et seq.
104 Exec. Order No. 12,661, 54 Fed. Reg. 779 (1989).
105 Id. at 781. At publication time, the regulations were not yet available, but they are expected
to be promulgated during early 1989.
106 S. REP. No. 80, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1987).
107 133 CONG. REc. S9696 (daily ed. July 10, 1987)(statement of Sen. Exon).
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inflows of foreign capital. Any change in policy must be evaluated for its
impact on the domestic economy. In addition, Congress must consider
the way in which foreign investors will perceive changes in United States
investment policy and how those perceptions will affect foreign invest-
ment decisions.
To meet these challenges, any legislative attempt to restrict foreign
investment requires careful deliberation and should not be an impulsive
reaction to temporarily unfavorable market conditions. The restrictions
on foreign investment which were implemented in the past were tailored
to specific industries, such as telecommunications, aviation and natural
resources. If restrictions based upon such a broad concept as national
security are to be implemented, they must be developed "systematically,
taking into consideration our existing domestic regulatory framework as
well as our international obligations."
108
Congress should not take any action which would discourage for-
eign investment in the United States, either intentionally or inadver-
tently. The United States has always been a favorable market for foreign
capital, and investors have been attracted by the stability and openness of
its social, political and economic framework. 1" However, by establish-
ing broad legal authority to block foreign investments, both original leg-
islative proposals would have signaled to current and potential foreign
investors that the United States is altering its traditional attitude toward
such investment.
Such a change would be dangerous, for the attitude-whether real
or perceived-of a host government toward foreign investment is an im-
portant factor in an investor's decision to invest in a particular coun-
try.110 An investor who confronts the possibility that the government
may step in at any time and disapprove a transaction is likely to pursue
alternate investments-not only in other industries, but also in other
countries. A policy which adds uncertainty to the investment climate
creates more risk for an investor, and can deter foreign investment in
other sectors of the economy.
Even the Senate version, which was less protectionist than the
House bill, failed to take account of those necessary considerations and,
consequently, would have created a riskier environment for investors, du-
plicated much of the authority already in effect, and might have induced
retaliatory restraints on United States investment in other nations. The
108 Acquisitions by Foriegn Companies, supra note 8, at 52 (Statement of Robert L. McNeil, Exec-
utive Vice Chairman, Emergency Committee for American Trade).
109 See supra text accompanying notes 7-10.
110 Operations of Federal Agencies, supra note 7, at 65.
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net effect of the Senate version would likely have been to undermine the
very features which make the United States an attractive market for for-
eign investment, while providing no more substantive protections than
are available under the existing restrictions.
The Conference Committee appears to have recognized the protec-
tionist nature of both original proposals. As a result, the enacted version
of the Exon Amendment attempts to restrict foreign investment which
truly threatens United States national security interests without institut-
ing protectionist barriers which might deter the flow of capital into the
United States and also lead to retaliatory restrictions against United
States investments overseas. Specifically, the Exon Amendment includes
provisions which impose a more definite time period during which
CFIUS may initiate an investigation, which limit the scope of authority
to true threats to national security, and which limit the discretionary
power of the President by requiring that it not be applied unless existing
legal authority is insufficient to deter the threat to national security.
One of the central drawbacks of the Senate version was its failure to
indicate when the Executive branch could initiate the transaction re-
views. This proposal specified no time frame within which to begin a
review, and it did not preclude the government from undertaking such
national security reviews even after the transaction had been completed.
Unlike antitrust reviews, which the general investment disclosure re-
quirements trigger automatically, this power of review was entirely
discretionary.
Investors, therefore, could not anticipate when, or if, the United
States government might initiate a national security review. With that
constant risk of governmental interference, investors would be less likely
to expend time, money and resources in pursuing such investment. In an
uncertain investment environment, fearful investors refrain from invest-
ing, whether or not their fears are legitimate.
In contrast, the Exon Amendment establishes a new practice,
whereby written notice must be filed with CFIUS describing proposed or
pending mergers, acquisitions and takeovers which could lead to foreign
control of United States companies.II If CFIUS determines that the in-
formation provided indicates that the transaction may affect national se-
curity, CFIUS may begin an investigation. However, the Amendment
requires that the investigation be initiated within thirty days after receiv-
111 Although neither the Exon Amendment nor the Executive Order establish a specific notifica-
tion process, the regulations which the Department of Treasury will promulgate will presumably set
forth the requirements with which foreign investors must comply to notify CFIUS of the transaction
and thereby trigger an Exon Amendment review.
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ing written notice of the proposed or pending transaction. The Executive
Order establishing CFIUS' authority to act under the Exon Amendment
requires that a decision by CFIUS not to investigate a proposed transac-
tion must be unanimous. Such a unanimous decision by CFJUS not to
investigate terminates all authority to review that particular transaction,
and the investors may proceed uninterrupted. If, however, CFIUS is un-
able to reach a unanimous decision not to investigate, the chairperson of
CFIUS, within twenty-five days after receiving notice of the pending
transaction, must submit a report to the President on the relevant issues
and the differing views of CFIUS. The President must then determine,
within the prescribed thirty day decision period, whether to initiate an
investigation. 112
By imposing a strict thirty day period in which to determine
whether an investigation is necessary, the Conference Committee sought
to eliminate the uncertainty and ambiguity present in the original Senate
bill. Such a limit makes it clear to foreign investors that all transactions
will be studied, at least preliminarily, but that a decision to investigate
will be made within thirty days and that no investigation may be initiated
after the decision period expires. Furthermore, the Exon Amendment
requires that if CFIUS or the President does conclude that an investiga-
tion is necessary, the investigation must be completed within forty-five
days after the determination to proceed with the investigation. This time
requirement again helps to eliminate uncertainty for the investors. Thus,
an investor will receive a decision on the transaction involved no later
than seventy-five days after CFIUS was first notified of the proposed
transaction.
Another significant problem with the Senate version was that the
breadth of factors to be considered in evaluating a foreign investment
appeared to establish a scope beyond merely its effect on national secur-
ity. The proposal specified that the President "shall" consider domestic
production requirements," 3 the "availability of [domestic] human re-
sources, products, technology, [and] raw materials,""' and "the capacity
of the United States to meet the requirements of national security and
essential commerce which affects national security.""' 5 The term "essen-
tial commerce" is vague and imprecise, and the text of the amendment
provided no clarification of its meaning. Establishing such an ambiguous
standard of review would have created the possibility that the Senate ver-
112 Exec. Order No. 12,661; 54 Fed. Reg. at 781 (1989).
113 H.RL 3 (Senate Version), § 1401 (721-e-1).
114 H.R. 3 (Senate Version), § 1401, (721-e-2).
115 H.R. 3 (Senate Version), § 1401 (721-e-3).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 9:658(1989)
sion might be applied not only to shield classified information from for-
eign investors, but also to prevent foreign investors from acquiring
successful United States businesses. Moreover, by measuring a proposed
investment against the ability of domestic companies to fulfill defense
contracts, the President would be able arbitrarily to block foreign invest-
ment in the United States for reasons unrelated to the protection of infor-
mation pertaining to United States national security.
The Senate version would have done more than create a basis of
authority to prevent foreign entities from acquiring control over sensitive
national security industries. Indeed, the amendment would have given
the President unprecedented discretionary power to protect domestic
businesses from their foreign competitors.
The protectionist character of the Senate version is contrary to the
United States traditional open investment policy. It would have allowed
almost any type of business to seek protection from foreign investors
under the "essential commerce affecting national security" provision.'
1 6
As a result, domestic companies would have been able to pressure the
Executive Branch to conduct investigations to delay or prevent otherwise
legitimate transactions. Legislation which creates such ambiguous and
arbitrary authority makes the United States investment climate more un-
certain, and discourages foreign investment in the United States.
The Conference Committee apparently recognized the dangers of
having such a broad, ambiguous scope of review, and instead recon-
structed the legislation with slightly more of a specific focus on national
security. While the Exon Amendment does not limit the factors which
may be considered in assessing the effects of the transaction on national
security, it does emphasize three principal factors:
(1) domestic production needed for projected national defense
requirements,
(2) the capability and capacity of domestic industries to meet national de-
fense requirements, including the availability of human resources, products,
technology, materials, and other supplies and services, and
(3) the control of domestic industries and commercial activity by foreign
citizens as it affects the capability and capacity of the United States to meet
the requirements of national security.'
7
These factors are very similar to the ones included in the original
Senate version, yet the Exon Amendment does not authorize an assess-
116 At the Senate hearing on this amendment, Commerce Secretary Baldridge expressed concern
that the "essential commerce" provision could enable businesses only remotely connected to defense
procurement and national security, such as the suppliers of shoes or buttons for the military, to
qualify for protection from foreign investors. See Acquisitions by Foreign Companies, supra note 8, at
50.
117 Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5021 (1988).
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ment of the impact on "essential commerce" and thereby redirects the
focus of the legislation towards true threats to national security. Fur-
thermore, the Amendment requires a finding of "credible evidence" that
the transaction would impair national security before the President may
take any action against the transaction. The Conference Committee
members emphasized that they "in no way intend to impose barriers to
foreign investment" and that the Exon Amendment "is not intended to
have any effect on transactions which are outside the realm of national
security."
118
However, the Conference Committee also stated that "the term 'na-
tional security' is intended to be interpreted broadly," that the term is
not meant to imply any limitation on the term "national defense" as used
elsewhere in the Defense Production Act, and that, in the past, the term
"national defense" has been correctly interpreted "to include the provi-
sion of a broad range of goods and services, as well as technological inno-
vations and economic stabilization efforts." '119 While these statements
raise the possibility that the investigatory authority could be applied
broadly, the overall focus of the Exon Amendment appears to be solely
upon protecting national security, and those assertions appear intended
only to provide broad authority to protect national security rather than
to create authority which can be applied to broad areas of commerce.
By focusing more specifically upon factors relevant to national se-
curity, the Exon Amendment emphasizes that the true intent of the
amendment is to protect sensitive national security information and facil-
ities from foreign control, and, in turn, lessens the danger that a Presi-
dent could arbitrarily use the Amendment as a tool to protect United
States companies from foreign investors, regardless of the existence of
any threats to national security.
Another significant problem with the Senate version, which has been
carried into the Exon Amendment, is that the authority granted to the
President duplicates some procedures of the current investment policy
and undermines others. CFIUS already has the authority to investigate,
on its own initiative or at the request of any agency or department, any
proposed transaction which "might have major implications for United
States national interests." 120 Thus, the authority to review investments
already exists within the Executive Branch. However, while the Senate
version required that the results of every investigation be submitted to
118 OMNIBus TRADE AND COMPETIIVENESS ACT OF 1988, CONFERENCE REPORT TO AccOM-
PANY H.R. 3, H. R. CoNF. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1959 (1988).
119 Id. at 1959-60.
120 Exec. Order No. 11,858, 3 C.F.R. 990 (1976).
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the President for review, the Conference version, as implemented by Ex-
ecutive Order 12,661, requires presidential review only when CFIUS is
unable to reach a unanimous decision on an investigation. This is a bet-
ter alternative, for if the investigation demonstrates no danger to national
security, or if the security threats can be eliminated without needlessly
delaying the transaction, presidential review should not be required. In
the past, CFIUS has made a practice of only submitting the most threat-
ening investment proposals for Cabinet-level consideration, for the
"overwhelming majority simply do not merit a higher level of review."121
Nevertheless, even the Exon Amendment's proposed review system
places constraints on the very process which CFIUS now uses to review
investments; namely, negotiations with the foreign investors. By working
with the investors, CFIUS provides advice on ways to structure the
transaction in order to minimize any threat to national security without
discouraging foreign investment. In addition, the Defense Industrial Se-
curity Program specifically permits foreign investment in defense indus-
tries when arrangements can be made to isolate sensitive information
from foreign control.122 The central problem with establishing a fixed
time limit in which to complete an investment review is that it works
against those transactions where intergovernmental consultations, or an
acceptable transaction arrangement, are not easily completed. A policy
which imposes time limitations upon situations best resolved through ne-
gotiated settlements can create a hostile environment for foreign
investment.
Finally, permitting the President to exercise broad authority to
block investments sends an improper signal to other governments, and
threatens recent United States efforts to remove barriers to trade and
investment in other nations. The United States is the leading proponent
of open investment policy throughout the world, and numerous non-gov-
ernmental organizations assist the United States government in promot-
ing the free flow of trade and capital throughout the world.
Implementing a policy contrary to the open investment principles to
which the United States has traditionally adhered will induce "a major
corrosive effect on other countries and tend to legitimize current and new
interventions in international investment on their part. ' 123 Such a retali-
atory effect would significantly harm United States investors, for the
United States invests more capital overseas than any other nation. Thus,
121 Acquisitions by Foreign Companies, supra note 8, at 20 (Statement of Commerce Secretary
Baldridge).
122 See supra text accompanying notes 46-54.
123 Operations of Federal Agencies, supra note 7, at 66.
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by undertaking a policy which permits broad government interventions




Substantial authority exists within the current framework of laws
and regulations to restrict foreign investment which threatens United
States national security interests. The Exon Amendment attempts to
consolidate the implementation of that authority within the Executive
Branch. The Exon Amendment seems to establish a new process that
CFIUS be notified of every proposed merger, acquisition or takeover
which could result in foreign control of businesses engaged in interstate
commerce in the United States. However, the Amendment is drawn
more narrowly than the initial House and Senate proposals, and the
statements of the Conference Committee express the intent that the
Amendment is not meant to impose any limitations on foreign invest-
ment which does not threaten national security interests.
To ensure that the authority granted by the Amendment is not ap-
plied to block transactions which do not threaten national security, the
regulations promulgated under the authority of the Amendment must
clearly specify how it will be applied and what is required of investors. If
the regulations are not clear and focused, foreign investors may fear arbi-
trary actions by the United States government. The Amendment broadly
defines national security, and, therefore, the regulations must ensure that
the power to investigate foreign investment does not become a tool to
protect United States business from foreign competition.
President Bush has indicated that his administration is committed
to pursuing a strong policy of open investment. Nevertheless, foreign
investment can present very real national security implications, and the
risks which can result from increased foreign investment in defense-re-
lated businesses often conflict with a commitment to the free market.
This complex issue involves contradictory factors such as trade policy,
free market principles, the need to maintain the commercial strength of
strategically important defense contractors, as well as the ability to mo-
bilize those businesses in the event of a national emergency. To maintain
the historical commitment to an open investment policy, and to keep the
domestic economy competitive and efficient, a policy which is intended
to limit national security risks should encourage the inflow of foreign
capital, while simultaneously restricting the access of foreign investors to
124 Id.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 9:658(1989)
sensitive defense information and technology. The policy should be con-
sistent with the goals of the Defense Industrial Security Program, which
permit foreign investment in sensitive industries when adequate security
precautions are implemented.
Only if the regulations which implement the Exon Amendment are
consistent with the expressed legislative intent that the power to suspend
or prohibit transactions should only be applied when true threats to na-
tional security interests exist which cannot be protected by other author-
ity, and if CFIUS exercises restraint in not using its investigatory power
to deter foreign investments which do not truly threaten national secur-
ity, will the Exon Amendment succeed as an effective tool to protect
national security interests without creating an unfavorable environment
for foreign investment.
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